STIPULATION - DISCONTINUANCE (POST RJI) - for National Grid Generation LLC dba National Grid September 04, 2015 (2024)

Case

Deborah Pettway v. Harlem Shangri La Housing Development Fund

Jul 29, 2024 |Torts - Other (slip and fall) |Torts - Other (slip and fall) |156867/2024

Case

Jul 29, 2024 |Torts - Medical, Dental, or Podiatrist Malpractice |Torts - Medical, Dental, or Podiatrist Malpractice |805208/2024

Case

Danielle M. Austin v. 1199 Housing Corporation, Metro Management Development

Jul 29, 2024 |Torts - Other (Slip & Fall) |Torts - Other (Slip & Fall) |156879/2024

Case

Juan Rodriguez Almanzar v. Gismelgi Cuevas Torres, Gina Torres Moronta

Jul 29, 2024 |Torts - Motor Vehicle |Torts - Motor Vehicle |156845/2024

Case

Elizabeth Alvarez v. Nyu Langone Hospitals

Jul 29, 2024 |Torts - Other Negligence (Trip and Fall) |Torts - Other Negligence (Trip and Fall) |156880/2024

Case

Miles Harris v. City Of New York, John Or Jane Doe 1 - 10

Jul 25, 2024 |Torts - Other (Police Misconduct) |Torts - Other (Police Misconduct) |156784/2024

Case

Abid Qureshi v. Jane St. Hospitality Llc, Rimowa, Inc., The Mercer I L.L.C., Richard Born, The City Of New York, The New York City Department Of Transportation

Jul 29, 2024 |Torts - Other (Trip & Fall) |Torts - Other (Trip & Fall) |156878/2024

Case

Victor Febrillet v. Zijin Zeng, Kellie Blake, Vincent Blake

Jul 29, 2024 |Torts - Motor Vehicle |Torts - Motor Vehicle |156864/2024

Case

Luis Diaz Jr, Doris Diaz v. Lubomyr Yavniuk

Jul 30, 2024 |Torts - Motor Vehicle |Torts - Motor Vehicle |156922/2024

Ruling

Jul 30, 2024 |CVPO20-0196313

SMITH, ET AL VS. PG&E CORPORATION, ET ALCase Number: CVPO20-0196313This matter is on calendar for review regarding status of coordinated proceeding. This matter iscurrently coordinated as JCCP No. 5165 in the San Francisco County Superior Court. No statusstatement has been filed since the most recent review date of January 29, 2024. An appearanceis necessary on today’s calendar to provide a status of the coordinated proceeding.

Ruling

SALTSMAN, Sr., et al. vs. HEADRICK LOGGING INC., et al.

Jul 29, 2024 |CVPO21-0198364

SALTSMAN, SR., ET AL. VS. HEADRICK LOGGING INC., ET AL.Case Number: CVPO21-0198364Tentative Ruling on Motion for Mental Examination and for Protective Order: Defendant HeadrickLogging, Inc. (hereinafter “Defendant”) move for an order requiring Plaintiff to a medical examination pursuantto CCP § 2032. Defendant also seeks a protective order as to the scope of tests, to permit a broad line ofquestioning and to limit the production of the audio record and raw data. Plaintiff’s opposition raises the issue ofan insufficient meet and confer process. Defendant’s reply concedes that the meet and confer efforts wereinsufficient as to the proposed tests and agrees that short continuance is warranted. This matter is continued toMonday, August 5, 2024, at 8:30 a.m. in Department 63. The parties are ordered to further meet and conferon all issues raised in the motion. The parties shall submit a Joint Statement which identifies the new meet andconfer efforts, and which identifies any unresolved issues. The Joint Statement shall be filed no later than July31, 2024. No appearance is necessary on today’s calendar.

Ruling

Stephen Siefke vs Jimmy Dutra, Jr

Jul 29, 2024 |22CV02174

22CV02174SIEFKE v. DUTRA DEFENDANT DUTRA’S MOTION TO COMPEL PLAINTIFF’S FURTHER RESPONSES TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS, SET THREE; FORM INTERROGATORIES, SET ONE; AND SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES, SET FOUR This case involves allegations of child sexual abuse by defendant. According to thecomplaint, in the summer of 2005, plaintiff, then 12 years old, vacationed with defendant, then30 years old, and his parents, in Southern California. It was during this trip that plaintiff allegeshe was molested by defendant. Trial is set to begin on September 3, 2024. These motions were set on shortened time. The motion is granted in part and denied in part, as discussed in detail below. Defendant seeks to compel further responses to request for production of documents, setthree; special interrogatories, set four; and form interrogatories, set one. Request for production, set three

Ruling

JONATHAN M JIMENEZ VS AMF BEVERLY LANES, ET AL.

Case Number: 21STCV31760 Hearing Date: July 29, 2024 Dept: 29 Motion for Terminating Sanctions filed by Defendant AMF Bowling Centers, Inc. Tentative The motion is denied without prejudice. Background On August 27, 2021, Plaintiff Jonathan M. Jimenez (Plaintiff), representing himself in pro per, filed a complaint against Defendants AMF Beverly Lanes, Bowlero Corporation, AMF Bowling Centers, Inc. and Does 1 through 10, asserting causes of action for negligence and premises liability arising out of a physical altercation occurring on August 30, 2019, at a bowling alley on West Beverly Boulevard in Montebello. On October 22, 2021, Defendant AMF Bowling Centers, Inc. (erroneously sued as AMF Beverly Lanes and Bowlero Corporation) (Defendant) filed an answer to the complaint. On April 23, 2024, the Court granted Defendants motion to compel and ordered Plaintiff to respond to Defendants Special Interrogatories (Set Two), Supplemental Interrogatories (Set One), and Supplemental Requests for Production (Set One). Plaintiff did not comply or respond to follow up communications from Defendants counsel. (Buckner Decl., ¶¶ 3-5.) On June 10, 2024, Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the case as a terminating sanction. No opposition has been filed. Legal Standard When a plaintiff fails to obey an order compelling answers to interrogatories, the court may make those orders that are just, including the imposition of an issue sanction, an evidence sanction, or a terminating sanction under Chapter 7 (commencing with Section 2023.010). In lieu of or in addition to, that sanction, the court may impose a monetary sanction under Chapter 7. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.290, subd. (c).) When a plaintiff fails to obey an order compelling responses to requests for production, the court may make those orders that are just, including the imposition of an issue sanction, an evidence sanction, or a terminating sanction under Chapter 7 (commencing with Section 2023.010). In lieu of or in addition to, that sanction, the court may impose a monetary sanction under Chapter 7. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.300, subd. (c).) In Chapter 7 of the Civil Discovery Act, section 2023.030 provides for monetary, evidence, issue, and terminating sanctions for any misuse of the discovery process, [t]o the extent authorized by the chapter governing any particular discovery method or any other provision of this title. A misuse of the discovery process is defined to include (among other things) failing to respond or to submit to an authorized method of discovery; making, without substantial justification, an unmeritorious objection to discovery; making an evasive response to a discovery request; disobeying a court order to provide discovery; and making or opposing, unsuccessfully, a motion to compel without substantial justification. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2023.010, subds. (d)-(h).) The Civil Discovery Act provides for an escalating and incremental approach to discovery sanctions, starting with monetary sanctions and ending with the ultimate sanction of termination. (Lopez v. Watchtower Bible & Tract Society of New York, Inc. (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 566, 604.) Discovery sanctions should be appropriate to and commensurate with the misconduct, and they should not exceed that which is required to protect the interests of the party entitled to but denied discovery. (Doppes v. Bentley Motors, Inc. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 967, 992.) If a lesser sanction fails to curb misuse, a greater sanction is warranted: continuing misuses of the discovery process warrant incrementally harsher sanctions until the sanction is reached that will curb the abuse. (Ibid.; see also, e.g., Mileikowsky v. Tenet Healthsystem (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 262, 279-280.) Terminating sanctions should be used sparingly. (Doppes, supra, 174 Cal.App.4th at p. 992; R.S. Creative, Inc. v. Creative Cotton, Ltd. (1999) 75 Cal. App. 4th 486, 496.) Although in extreme cases a court has the authority to order a terminating sanction as a first measure, a terminating sanction should generally not be imposed until the court has attempted less severe alternatives and found them to be unsuccessful and/or the record clearly shows lesser sanctions would be ineffective. (Lopez, supra, 246 Cal.App.4th at p. 604.) But where discovery violations are willful, preceded by a history of abuse, and the evidence shows that less severe sanctions would not produce compliance with the discovery rules, the trial court is justified in imposing the ultimate sanction. (Doppes, supra, 174 Cal.App.4th at p. 992.) Repeated and willful violations of discovery orders that prejudice the opposing party may warrant a terminating sanction. (Creed-21 v. City of Wildomar (2017) 18 Cal.App.5th 690, 702; Los Defensores, Inc. v. Gomez (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 377, 390; Biles v. Exxon Mobil Corp. (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 1315, 1327; Lang v. Hachman (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 1225, 1246; Collisson X Kaplan v. Hartunian (1994) 21 Cal.App.4th 1611, 1617-1622.) The primary purpose of discovery sanctions is to obtain compliance with the Civil Discovery Act and the Courts orders. It is not to punish. (Newland v. Super. Ct. (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 608, 613; Ghanooni v. Super Shuttle of Los Angeles (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 256, 262.) A discovery sanction should not create a windfall for a party or place a party in a better position than it would have been if the opposing party had simply complied with its obligations under the Courts orders and the Civil Discovery Act. (Rutledge v. Hewlett-Packard Co. (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 1164, 1194; see also 2 Weil & Brown, California Practice Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial (The Rutter Group 2023), ¶¶ 8:2214-2220.) It is never justified for a court to impose a terminating sanction solely because of a failure to pay a monetary discovery sanction. (Newland, supra, 40 Cal.App.4th at p. 615.) Discussion Defendant seeks terminating sanctions for Plaintiffs violation of a court order requiring Plaintiff to provide responses to interrogatories and requests for production. Defendant served in pro per Plaintiff electronically (per the proof of service). Although electronic service may be mandatory for represented parties, litigants who are in pro per are not subject to mandatory email service, and Defendant has presented no evidence that Plaintiff has consented to email service. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 1010.6, subd. (c)(2); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 2.251(c)(3)(B).) Notice of this motion was not properly served on Plaintiff. Accordingly, the Defendants motion for terminating sanctions is DENIED without prejudice. The Court also notes, but does not decide, that the notice of ruling on the motion to compel was given electronically (and therefore may not be adequate). The Court also observes, but does not decide. that the violation of one court order, although a serious matter that commonly merits sanctions, may not be a sufficient basis for a terminating sanction. Conclusion The Court DENIES Defendants motion for terminating sanctions without prejudice for failure to provide adequate proof of service on the pro per Plaintiff. Moving Party is ordered to give notice.

Ruling

Stutesman vs. Vang

Jul 30, 2024 |24CV-0204805

STUTESMAN VS. VANGCase Number: 24CV-0204805Tentative Ruling on Motion to Strike: Defendant Emmanual Vang moves to strike portions of Plaintiff KelceyStutesman’s Complaint filed on April 17, 2024. Plaintiff opposes the motion.Meet and Confer Requirements. Before filing a motion to strike a party is required to meet and confer in personor on the telephone. CCP § 435.5(a). A motion to strike shall be supported by a declaration stating either thatthe parties met and conferred or that they were unable to meet and confer. CCP § 435.5(a)(3). The Declarationof Timothy I. Mulcahey provides evidence of sufficient efforts to meet and confer.Motion to Strike Standard. A motion to strike can be used to attack the entire pleading, or any part thereof,including single words or phrases. Stearns Ranchos v. Atchison Topeka & Santa Fe Railway (1981) 19 Cal. App.3d 24. It is proper for the Court to strike any irrelevant, false or improper matter. CCP § 436(a). The Court canalso strike any part of a pleading that is not drawn or filed in conformity with California law. CCP § 436(b).Merits. Defendant moves to strike “punitive damages” from ¶ 14(a)(2) of the Complaint and the entirety of theExemplary Damages Attachment. Recovery of punitive damages is codified in Civ. Code § 3294 which reads, inpart: (a) In an action for the breach of an obligation not arising from contract, where it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice, the plaintiff, in addition to the actual damages, may recover damages for the sake of example and by way of punishing the defendant. … (c) As used in this section, the following definitions shall apply: (1) “Malice” means conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others. (2) “Oppression” means despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person’s rights.The facts asserted to support malice or oppression are included in the Exemplary Damages Attachment. The factsalleged include that Plaintiff was stopped at a red light, Defendant accelerated and rammed into Plaintiff’s vehicle,Defendant did not stop, and Defendant chose to flee the scene. Plaintiff further alleges that Plaintiff’s vehiclewas still drivable and Plaintiff gave chase until the Redding Police responded. Based on the damages, Defendantmust have been aware of the collision. Defendant’s acts are alleged to constitute a crime under Vehicle Codesection 20001 and Plaintiff asserts that Defendant’s acts were despicable. Plaintiff alleges punitive damagesunder both a malice and oppression theory.The facts alleged in the Complaint do not make it clear how severe the collision was, whether any damage toPlaintiff’s vehicle was visible, whether any injuries to Plaintiff were visible, or how far Defendant fled the sceneor in what manner. Many of the statements made are conclusions rather than statements of fact. Plaintiff did notallege that Defendant knew that Plaintiff was injured and the facts alleged are insufficient to support Defendant’sknowledge of injury. The allegation that fleeing the scene caused additional injury is also based on conclusionsrather than statements of fact. It is unclear how long medical treatment was delayed or how giving chase toDefendant affected Plaintiff’s injuries which are alleged to be “severe” without further detail.While it is certainly possible for a hit and run collision to result in a valid claim for punitive damages, the factsasserted here are so conclusory and vague that the Court cannot conclude that malice or oppression are properlyalleged. Without malice or oppression, punitive damages are not available to Plaintiff and the ExemplaryDamages Attachment would be unnecessary. “The law does not favor the imposition of punitive damages. Theyshould only be allowed in the ‘clearest of cases.’ Woolstrom v. Mailloux (1983) 141 Cal. App. 3d Supp 1, 9.Leave to Amend. Where there is a reasonable possibility that leave to amend can cure the defect noted in a motionto strike, Courts routinely grant such leave. It appears correcting the defects noted is possible here and the Courtwill grant Plaintiff leave to amend.The motion is GRANTED. Should Plaintiff intend to file a First Amended Complaint, the First AmendedComplaint must be filed and served within thirty days of today’s hearing. Should Plaintiff not file a FirstAmended Complaint, Defendant has ten days from the expiration of the time to file a First Amended Complaintto answer or otherwise plead to the Complaint. Defendant did not provide a proposed Order as required by LocalRule of Court 5.17(D). Defendant is to prepare the Order consistent with the Court’s ruling.****************************************************************************************** 9:00 a.m. – Review Hearings******************************************************************************************

Ruling

RICHARDS vs KAISER PERMANENTE, et al.

Aug 01, 2024 |Civil Unlimited (Medical Malpractice - Physici...) |24CV062948

24CV062948: RICHARDS vs KAISER PERMANENTE, et al. 08/01/2024 Hearing on Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint in Department 25Tentative Ruling - 07/31/2024 Jenna WhitmanThe Motion re: Leave to Amend Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint to Second AmendedComplaint filed by Kenesha Richards on 06/21/2024 is Granted.The unopposed motion of plaintiffto file Second Amended Complaint is GRANTED. Plaintiffshall file and serve the Second Amended Complaint within 10 days of this order.

Ruling

Eads, Michelle vs. International Suites LLC et al

Aug 12, 2024 |S-CV-0051971

S-CV-0051971 Eads, Michelle vs. International Suites LLC et al** NOTE: telephonic appearances are strongly encouragedAppearance required. Complaint is not at issue - Need responsive pleading,default or dismissal as to Defendant(s): Intercontinental Hotels Group;International Suites LLCAdditionally, no proof of service has been filed as to Defendant(s):Intercontinental Hotels Group; International Suites LLC

Ruling

MARCIA MINGO VS ALICIA ANN PARTNER

Jul 29, 2024 |23TRCV03433

Case Number: 23TRCV03433 Hearing Date: July 29, 2024 Dept: M LOS ANGELES SUPERIOR COURT SOUTHWEST DISTRICT Honorable Gary Y. Tanaka Monday, July 29, 2024 Department M Calendar No. 9 PROCEEDINGS Marcia Mingo v. Alicia Ann Partner, et al. 23TRCV03433 1. Ronnivashti Whiteheads, Counsel for Plaintiff Marcia Mingo, Motion to be Relieved as Counsel TENTATIVE RULING Ronnivashti Whiteheads, Counsel for Plaintiff Marcia Mingo, Motion to be Relieved as Counsel is denied without prejudice. Background Plaintiff filed the Complaint on October 16, 2023. Plaintiff alleges the following facts. Plaintiff and Defendant were involved in a motor vehicle accident. Motion to be Relieved as Counsel Counsel states, in the declaration, valid reasons for withdrawal. Counsel states that there has been a breakdown in communication between counsel and Plaintiff. The Court finds that the attorney has filed the required declaration. The Court also finds that the attorney has shown sufficient reasons why the motion to be relieved as counsel should be granted and why the attorney brought a motion under Code of Civil Procedure § 284(2) instead of filing a consent under section 284(1). The Court finds that the attorney filed the proposed order. However, the attorney did not file the proof of service of the motion. The attorney does state that the attorney served all necessary documents but did not file the actual proof of service. Therefore, the motion to be relieved as counsel is denied without prejudice, unless moving party can produce proof of service of the motion. Ronnivashti Whitehead is ordered to give notice of the Courts ruling.

Document

Margaret Russell v. Leslie H Kaminoff, Southeast Commercial, Llc D/B/A Two Lincoln Square

Nov 22, 2023 |Shlomo S. Hagler |Torts - Adult Survivors Act |Torts - Adult Survivors Act |952328/2023

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Sep 24, 2009 |Anil Singh |Tort |Tort |601824/2009

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Sep 24, 2009 |Anil Singh |Tort |Tort |601824/2009

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Elzbieta Wojda v. Christine Hoar, Pascale Willi

Jul 30, 2024 |Torts - Motor Vehicle |Torts - Motor Vehicle |156911/2024

Document

Christina Thomas v. Avon Products, Inc., Chanel, Inc, Clinique Laboratories, Llc, Estee Lauder Inc., Imi Fabi (Diana) Llc, Kolmar Laboratories, Inc., L'Oreal Usa, Inc., Revlon Inc., Individually And As Successorin-Interest To Charles Of The Ritz, The Estee Lauder Companies Inc., Yves Saint Laurent America, Inc.

May 27, 2020 |Adam Silvera |Torts - Asbestos |Torts - Asbestos |190126/2020

Document

Destiny Waller v. Planet Fitness, Inc., Ots Events, L.P., Countdown Entertainment, Llc, Times Square Alliance

Feb 11, 2021 |Shlomo S. Hagler |Torts - Other Negligence (Premises Liability) |Torts - Other Negligence (Premises Liability) |151498/2021

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Sep 24, 2009 |Anil Singh |Tort |Tort |601824/2009

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Christina Thomas v. Avon Products, Inc., Chanel, Inc, Clinique Laboratories, Llc, Estee Lauder Inc., Imi Fabi (Diana) Llc, Kolmar Laboratories, Inc., L'Oreal Usa, Inc., Revlon Inc., Individually And As Successorin-Interest To Charles Of The Ritz, The Estee Lauder Companies Inc., Yves Saint Laurent America, Inc.

May 27, 2020 |Adam Silvera |Torts - Asbestos |Torts - Asbestos |190126/2020